01An outage with no attacker
On 19 July 2024 a faulty software update from the security company CrowdStrike crashed Windows computers around the world. Microsoft estimated 8.5 million devices were affected, under 1% of all Windows machines, per its own blog post, yet the effect was out of proportion because those machines were concentrated in airlines, hospitals, banks and broadcasters. Published estimates of the financial damage run to at least US$10 billion. There was no attack, only a bad update to a tool installed to prevent attacks.
It matters because it showed the blast radius of a mistake. An attacker who finds the same lever does not need to hack a thousand companies; they need to hack the one they share.
02The third-party problem
Verizon's 2025 Data Breach Investigations Report analysed more than 22,000 security incidents, including 12,195 confirmed breaches, and found that the share of breaches involving a third party doubled from 15% to 30% in a year. Vulnerability exploitation, particularly in edge devices and VPNs, also rose. Every business now depends on its suppliers' security, and often cannot see it.
- Vendor as door: attackers reach many customers by compromising one supplier or tool (the pattern behind the 2025 grocery-distributor incidents in retail).
- Vendor as blast radius: a common controller or product means one flaw affects many stores at once. This is the apparent shape of the supermarket fridge attacks, where a Danfoss product line was named in several countries.
- Vendor as failure: the CrowdStrike case, where no attacker was involved at all.
03What reduces it
- 01Know your dependencies: list the vendors whose failure would stop you, and the vendors those vendors rely on.
- 02Stage updates: roll to a small group first, as many organisations changed their policy after July 2024.
- 03Plan for the vendor being down: manual fallbacks, a second provider for the truly critical function, tested restore procedures.
- 04Ask suppliers for evidence: patch cadence, access controls, incident notification terms.
- 05Limit what each vendor can reach with least-privilege credentials, so a compromised supplier cannot walk the whole network.
Payments are a good example of a dependency worth designing for. A merchant that takes cards, bank transfers and crypto through a gateway has more than one route if one rail or provider fails. Redundancy is not exciting, but it is what keeps a store trading.
04Sources
Questions
- What caused the CrowdStrike outage?
- A faulty software update from CrowdStrike on 19 July 2024 crashed Windows machines running its security sensor. It was not a cyberattack. Microsoft estimated 8.5 million devices were affected.
- What is concentration risk in technology?
- The risk that many organisations depend on the same vendor, product or cloud, so one failure or compromise affects all of them at once.
- How common are third-party breaches?
- Verizon's 2025 report found third-party involvement in 30% of breaches it analysed, double the 15% of the year before.
Keep reading
- Shelves, showrooms and assembly lines: what the M&S, Co-op and Jaguar Land Rover attacks taught usHow the 2025 cyberattacks on Marks & Spencer, Co-op and Jaguar Land Rover show that modern business depends on a few fragile systems, with costs of £80m to about £1.9bn.
- Someone is hacking supermarket fridges: what we know about the attacks across EuropeHackers pushed supermarket fridges and freezers to 50°C in France in October and across Belgium, Sweden, Ireland and Estonia on 2 November 2026. What happened, how, and why it matters.
- How to defend against cyberattacks: the checklist that matches how attacks actually happenA short, evidence-based defence checklist for a business or shop: exposure, patching, MFA, backups, verification, supplier risk and payment controls, drawn from real 2024–2026 incidents.
- How a crypto payment gateway works, from invoice to settlementHow a crypto payment gateway works, step by step: invoices, one-time deposit addresses, confirmations, settlement and withdrawals.